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The use of financial interdiction to disrupt the development of weapons of  
mass destruction (WMD) and their components is an option in the so-called 
counterproliferation toolkit. The effectiveness of economic counterproliferation 
interdiction operations is frequently debated; however, counterproliferation operations 
have successfully stopped some global WMD illicit trade. What is unknown is the degree 
to which counterproliferation has inhibited further proliferation of WMD. Understanding 
the effectiveness of U.S.-led financial interdiction efforts against Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program has significant policy implications. U.S. policy makers need to know whether 
their current financial interdiction operations are effective at stopping or delaying Iran’s 
nuclear weapon program. Evidence from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
indicates that the current U.S. economic counterproliferation strategy against Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program failed to slow down Iran’s nuclear program as uranium 
enrichment increased despite implementation of further economic sanctions; however, 
evidence indicates the overall counterproliferation strategy eventually brought Iran to the 
negotiation table, thus temporarily halting further nuclear weapons development. The 
final result of U.S.-led economic counterproliferation policy, along with the use of other 
counterproliferation tools, ultimately has been effective at disrupting and temporarily 
halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The use of financial interdiction to disrupt the development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and their components is one of the options in the so-called 
counterproliferation toolkit.1 The net effectiveness of financial interdiction is often 
debated; however, what is known is that these types of counterproliferation operations 
have successfully stopped some global WMD illicit trade.2 What is unknown is the 
degree to which counterproliferation has inhibited further proliferation of WMD. 
Examining the effectiveness of U.S.-led financial interdiction programs against 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program has significant policy implications. U.S. policy makers 
need to know if their current financial interdiction operations are effective at stopping or 
delaying Iran’s nuclear weapon program and if further development of a more robust 
interdiction program can further deteriorate Iran’s ability to import materials and delivery 
systems required for nuclear weapons development. An assessment is warranted 
regardless of the results and adherence of the current nuclear negotiations with Iran and 
P5 +1 countries. If Iran does or does not ultimately accept the terms of the agreement to 
curtail its nuclear program, the United States will still need to interdict illicit financial 
support for nuclear material and delivery systems Iran may continue to pursue covertly.  
The thesis examines U.S.-led multilateral and international nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation origins and policy, effects of U.S.-led economic counterproliferation 
policy by analyzing historical evidence and data to determine if current financial 
interdiction operations were able to hinder or stop Iran from procuring or developing 
nuclear materials required to continue its nuclear program, and to what degree these 
operations affected Iran’s breakout timeline in developing a nuclear device. 
Counterproliferation efforts can be considered effective if they increased Iran’s breakout 
timeline by constraining the ability to obtain nuclear materials with which to build 
                                                 
1 Zachary S. Davis, “Bombs Away: Interdicting Proliferation.” The American Interest 4, no. 3. 
January, 2009. http://search.proquest.com/docview/224659156?accountid=12702. 
2 Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,” United 
States Naval War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA520253. 
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nuclear devices through illicit trading or forced Iran to make difficult economic choices. 
Conversely, the efforts are ineffective if the breakout timeline decreased or did not 
otherwise affect Iranian decision-making. If deemed ineffective, the thesis will argue how 
the U.S. can further develop its counterproliferation policy and operations to provide a 
more robust strategy. It is possible that any changes in U.S.-led counterproliferation 
policy would have no effect on Iran’s nuclear program, because it is possible that Iran is 
truly committed to developing a nuclear weapon and cannot be stopped. If this were the 









A. COUNTERPROLIFERATION  VS. NONPROLIFERATION 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a top priority for the United 
States and global security. Nuclear weapons have the ability to inflict massive damage 
and therefore represent a threat to national, regional, and global stability.3 The spread of 
nuclear devices, materials, components, and related technologies have led to the creation 
of several international and multilateral agreements to prevent such weapons from 
proliferating. Most recent operations have involved nonproliferation initiatives led by the 
United States, which has increased the level of cooperation among partner countries. 
Counterproliferation efforts on the other hand have remained largely impromptu and 
involved fewer partners.4  
Counterproliferation is closely related to nonproliferation; however, both  
terms are very distinct concepts in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. “Nonproliferation broadly denotes the means and methods for preventing the 
acquisition, transfer, discovery, or development of materials, technology, knowledge, 
munitions/devices or delivery systems related to WMD.”5 Counterproliferation is an 
attempt to, “(1) directly forestalling, rolling back, or eliminating efforts to proliferate 
WMD, and (2) preventing a WMD-armed actor from realizing any benefit from  
owning or employing these weapons.”6 The United States and its partners have 
continually used several counterproliferation instruments in order to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. These so-called counterproliferation tools have 
included the following: diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence 
                                                 
3  Arms Control Today, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction December 
2002,” January 1, 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1184.  
4 Justin Anderson, Thomas Devine, and Rebecca Gibbons, “Nonproliferation and 






and law enforcement.7 The focus of the thesis is on financial interdiction, which falls into 
the counterproliferation category.  
B. U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES 
The formation of U.S. nonproliferation policy began with the Manhattan Project 
and early efforts to control the spread of nuclear technology. On June 14, 1946, the 
United States offered a proposal to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
(UNAEC) called the Baruch Plan. The plan proposed the establishment of an Atomic 
Development Authority (ADA) under the auspices of the fledgling United Nations. The 
Authority created an international effort to oversee the use of nuclear energy and to avert 
potential nuclear proliferation. Another influential study, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 
echoed the call for the formation of the Atomic Development Authority, “to oversee the 
mining and use of fissile materials, the operation of all nuclear facilities that could 
produce weaponry, and the right to dispense licenses to those countries wishing to pursue 
peaceful nuclear research.”8 The Baruch proposal never came to fruition as the Soviet 
Union objected to the U.S. nuclear monopoly that would be perpetuated under the plan 
and ultimately refrained from voting in the December 30, 1946, UNAEC resolution to 
form the ADA, thus killing the proposal.9  
U.S. policy further advanced when President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave a 1953 
address called “Atoms for Peace” to the United Nations. In this address, Eisenhower 
proposed the transfer of nuclear technology and material to countries for peaceful 
purposes. This proposal was the starting point for the formation of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and bolstered the U.S. Atomic Energy Act allowing for 
peaceful nuclear assistance. The IAEA was placed in charge of verifying that non nuclear 
weapon possessing member states’ nuclear programs were for peaceful purposes. 
Additionally under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA received 
                                                 
7 Davis, “Bombs Away.”  
8 United States Department of State, “The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946,” Office of the 
Historian, accessed on March 10, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945–1952/baruch-plans.  
9 Ibid.  
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more authority for inspecting suspected nuclear weapons programs.10 The NPT and 
IAEA are discussed further in the thesis. What is most important, however, is the central 
role they played in the development of internationally accepted nonproliferation norms of 
behavior.  
In addition to U.S. policy initiatives, the U.S. pioneered nonproliferation laws  
to complement IAEA enforcement tools. One of those laws was crafted out of what  
was called a “critical turn” in U.S. nonproliferation policy. The 1978 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) was in response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test and other 
potential states that were operating outside of the NPT. The new law required strict 
safeguards for countries that wished to acquire nuclear technologies and supplies. The 
primary objective of the NNPA was “to make the international nuclear fuel cycle a less 
attractive platform from which to develop nuclear weapons. The NNPA envisioned 
sticking to a once-through fuel cycle that would avoid using separated plutonium, or 
separated uranium-233 (U-233), or HEU.”11 Additionally, the NNPA had significant 
influence on nuclear export controls, as it required extensive full scope safeguards as a 
condition of supply.12  
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was additionally formed in 1974 to 
implement nuclear export guidelines that would contribute to the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The NSG formally adopted the same additional NNPA provisions in 
1992, after the bombshell revelation of Iraq’s pre-1991 weapons of mass destruction 
program. In addition to the 1992 provisions, the NSG adopted even stricter guidelines for 
the export of nuclear related supplies and developed additional protocols for the transfer 
of dual-use equipment, material, and technologies in order to safeguard against furthering 
the nuclear cycle.13 This meant that countries attempting to import nuclear technology 
must accept safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear programs, and cannot possess 
                                                 
10 George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” Arms Control 
Today, accessed on March 7, 2015, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn. 
11 Sharon Squassoni, “LOOKING BACK: The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,” Arms Control 
Today, December 4, 2008, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/lookingback_NPT.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Nuclear Suppliers Group, Accessed on October 8, 2015, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/.  
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undeclared or off limits nuclear activities. These reforms coincided with efforts by the 
IAEA to prevent a repeat of the Iraq situation in which Saddam Hussein’s regime 
possessed many covert nuclear facilities while remaining a member in good standing of 
the NPT and IAEA.  
The NSG, in coordination with the IAEA, adopted several other mechanisms in 
order to safeguard against illicit transfer of nuclear goods. In 2005, the NSG developed a 
“fallback” safeguard provision if the IAEA could no longer execute its authority over a 
country’s nuclear program. The fallback safeguard was intended for supplier and receipt 
states to take appropriate measures to assure nuclear materials would not be transferred to 
the uncooperative state. In 2010, the NSG formed a technical group in order to keep pace 
with dual-use technologies. The group continually updates the IAEA on additional trigger 
list items because of the potential nuclear cycle or weapons manufacturing ramifications 
of those newly designed dual-use technologies.14    
In addition to the NSG, the end of the Cold War brought further changes with 
respect to addressing international nuclear security concerns that involved dual-use 
technologies and the export of those items. An agreement was established called the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The arrangement was formalized in December 1995 with 
33 countries signing the agreement, to include the United States. Like the NSG, the WA 
maintains a control list of dual-use components. The control list is used to report on illicit 
transfers and denials outside of the arrangement members. Additionally, the arrangement 
allowed the exchange of sensitive dual-use technologies. 15  Like the NSG, the WA lacks 
enforcement mechanisms and is voluntary.  
United States nonproliferation policy, laws, and initiatives, which include 
partnering with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement, have been 
largely effective at curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, except in cases where 
a state is truly committed to building a nuclear device. Atoms For Peace initially failed to 
                                                 
14 Nuclear Suppliers Group.  
15 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and 
Technologies, Accessed on October 12, 2015, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/howitworks.html. 
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have the intended effect of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, 
many of the international nonproliferation regimes created to facilitate nonproliferation 
have had limited success in regulating the import and export of controlled items. These 
items have still found a path to states that wished to develop a nuclear weapon. Some of 
the mechanisms developed may have safeguarded against some illicit transfers; however, 
by and large countries such as Iran have been able to import required nuclear materials 
and technologies for their weapons program. Iran has been able to work around NSG 
initiated IAEA full-scope safeguards by engaging countries that have not signed the 
nonproliferation initiatives, in addition to the purchase of illicit goods through black 
market networks. Furthermore, nonproliferation agreements often lacked significant 
enforcement tools, and simply asked participating states to adhere to the nonproliferation 
policy of controlling nuclear trade.  
C. U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY 
The formation of U.S. counterproliferation policy can be traced to the Clinton 
Administration, largely as a result of the aftermath of the first Gulf War. The Clinton 
Administration’s after action report given to Congress, along with the 1993 Department 
of Defense review, found deficiencies in U.S. capabilities to combat WMD.16 Initial steps 
in the development of counterproliferation policy emerged in December 1993 with the 
launch of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). The primary objective of the 
policy was to warn potential adversaries of the United States that the use of weapons of 
mass destruction would not deter U.S. application of military force. In May 1994, 
Department of Defense Counterproliferation Policy further advanced the concept, and by 
July 1996, DOD had more clearly defined counterproliferation responsibilities and 
relationships between different WMD organizations.17  
Additionally in April 1996, the Department of Defense Counterproliferation 
Council was formed by the Secretary of Defense to insure the proper training, equipping, 
                                                 
16 The Air University, “The Origin of Counterproliferation,” Accessed on March 10, 2015, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/xon/definition.htm. 
17 Ibid.  
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and exercising of U.S. military forces in counterproliferation operations.18 The U.S. 
defense policy on counterproliferation focused on five Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
(NBC) areas:  
1. Prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery; 
2. Roll back proliferation where it has occurred; 3. Deter and prevent the 
use of NBC weapons against the United States, its allies, and United States 
and allied forces; and, 4. Adapt U.S. military forces, planning, doctrine 
and training to operate effectively against the threats posed by NBC 
weapons and their means of delivery. 5. Detect, prevent, defeat, and 
manage the consequences of NBC materials or weapons use by 
terrorists.19 
Goldman School of Public Policy at University of California Berkley professor 
and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Michael Nacht 
also traced the history of interdiction as an instrument to counterproliferation capabilities 
to the 1990s.20 However, Professor Nacht pointed to the ending of the Cold War when it 
appeared that many nations had renewed interests in obtaining nuclear weapons to defend 
themselves against regional adversaries, such as South Korea and Taiwan. The United 
States used a counterproliferation deterrence policy as part of its objective to dissuade 
these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon. The U.S. deterrence policy provided 
South Korea and Taiwan protection from potential regional adversaries by conventional 
military and nuclear defense agreements. Additionally, countering Iraq’s secret weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) program discovered by the United States also accelerated the 
development of Clinton counterproliferation policy.21 Furthermore, the underestimates of 
Iraq’s WMD programs caused analyst to overcompensate for intelligence gaps, which led 
to even further acceleration of counterproliferation policy and ultimately led to the flawed 
2002 National Intelligence Estimate.22 Counterproliferation deterrence policy described 
                                                 
18 Air University, “Origin of Counterproliferation.” 
19 Ibid. 
20 Michael Nacht, “U.S. Counterproliferation Policy,” Wilson Center International Security Studies 
Minutes, January 27, 2005, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-counterproliferation-policy. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths,” 
November 28, 2003, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-
archive-2003/pr11282003.html.  
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by Professor Nacht appears to be still relevant today and the policy continues to 
discourage nuclear weapons development in East Asia.  
Before September 11, 2001 (9/11), counterproliferation policy appeared to be 
primarily focused on state actors, with very little attention given to non-state actors and 
terrorists groups. The focus of counterproliferation on nuclear armed state actors and 
deterring further state proliferation allowed the AQ Khan network to thrive and operate 
undeterred until the eventual exposure in 2004. Previous presidential administrations 
should have focused more resources on non-state actors, especially third party 
intermediaries working on behalf of states. If they had, the Khan network would have 
possibly been stopped earlier and less global proliferation would have occurred. An 
eventual turn in focus to non-state actors did change with the new counterproliferation 
strategy implemented by the George W. Bush Administrations as a result of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.  
D. U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001  
After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon 
in Washington, DC, the George W. Bush Administration refocused even more attention 
on counterproliferation strategy. The Pentagon developed four objectives in response to 
the elevated concern over WMD proliferation; “First, to keep WMD technology out of 
the wrong hands; second, to eliminate or destroy WMD capabilities should proliferation 
occur; third, to develop the capacity to fight in a WMD environment, if necessary; and 
fourth, to mitigate environmental consequences should WMD use by an adversary 
occur.”23 Overall, U.S. policy toward counterproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction was overshadowed by the parallel focus on counterterrorism activities.24  
 In addition to the reinvigorated Department of Defense counterproliferation 
strategy, the Bush Administration highlighted the threat of potential state and non-state 




actors procuring and trading weapons of mass destruction.25 As part of their new strategy, 
the Administration developed financial interdiction as a key piece to the broader 
counterproliferation policy. The Administration continued to stress the importance of 
nonproliferation policy, while “elevating the status of proactive counterproliferation 
efforts to deter and defend against WMD and missile threats as well as effective 
consequence management should such weapons be used.”26  
 The Administration further crafted and led the charge with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which affirmed proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction as well as their delivery systems was not acceptable state behavior. 
Additionally, the Resolution affirmed actions would be taken against any actor that may 
threaten world peace through the proliferation of WMD and encompassed the prevention 
of WMD procurement.27 UNSCR 1540 has been extended three times, 2011 being the 
latest extension. The 2011 addendum is in effect until 2021 and continues the original 
mandate that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their 
means of delivery constitute a threat to international peace and security.”28 Additionally, 
the 1540 Committee continues to facilitate technical assistance and cooperation with 
international organizations to further counter the proliferation of nuclear materials and 
technologies.29 
Juan C. Zarate, a former Bush National Security Council staffer and a Senior 
Advisor for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, observed the  
George W. Bush Administration used “a new brand of financial war against rogue 
regimes, terrorist groups, and criminal syndicates. By leveraging American global 
                                                 
25 Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security,” The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly 26: 2, 
http://wmdcenter.DoDlive.mil/files/2012/02/the-best-defense.pdf. 
26 Ibid., 2. 
27 United States Department of State, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Accessed on October 
8, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm.  
28 United Nations, 1540 Committee. Accessed on October 12, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/. 
29 Ibid. 
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economic predominance, the U.S. has isolated such actors from the financial system.”30 
The use of Iranian sanctions was an example of this new financial war. This new take on 
the old technique of financial coercion allowed the United States to more effectively use 
“financial tools, pressure, and market forces to leverage the banking sector, private-sector 
interests, and foreign partners to isolate rogue actors from the international financial and 
commercial systems and eliminate their funding sources.”31 The Obama Administration 
has continued and relies heavily on sanctions against Iran’s economy in an attempt to 
change Iran’s behavior. Economic sanctions cannot solve all of the United State’s 
perceived security issues; however, the newly enhanced financial warfare techniques can 
affect behavior of an adversary.32  
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States went on the offensive against the 
financing of terrorism.  
There were three primary themes defining this campaign that shaped the 
environment and evolution of financial power after 9/11: the expansion of 
the international anti-money laundering regime; the development of 
financial tools and intelligence geared specifically to dealing with issues 
of broad national security; and the growth of strategies based on a new 
understanding of the centrality of both the international financial system 
and the private sector to transnational threats and issues pertaining to 
national security.33  
The change in tactics against terror organizations and proliferation networks 
completely overhauled the way banks and other financial institutions operated in this new 
environment. Additionally, the change in post-9/11 tactics impacted how foreign nations 
addressed illicit financing. Zarate concluded, “Economic sanctions and financial 
influence are now the national security tools of choice when neither diplomacy nor 
military force proves effective or possible.”34  
                                                 
30 Juan Carlos Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2013), 87, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Winter_2013/9_Zarate.pdf.  
31 Ibid., 88. 
32 Ibid., 88. 
33 Ibid., 89. 
34 Ibid., 89. 
 12 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, the Bush Administration 
ushered in new counterproliferation tactics, primarily being reinvigorated financial levers 
and interdiction, though economic coercion was not a new tactic in international 
relations. The new counterproliferation strategy decreased overall global proliferation of 
nuclear materials and technologies; however, the new strategy failed to adequately 
address some state-sponsored proliferation, as Iran continued to further develop its 
nuclear weapons program. In addition to the Bush Administration policy changes, the 
United States led the charge in extending United Nation Security Council Resolution 
1540. UNSCR 1540 stated and reaffirmed that nuclear proliferation is a security risk and 
continued to mandate the obligation of enacting and enforcing proliferation laws; 
however, UNSCR 1540 also failed to stop Iran from further development of its nuclear 
weapons program. The United States and other partner countries have additionally 
attempted to use the United Nations Security Council to further alter Iran’s nuclear 
behavior; however, Russia and China have often interjected with their veto ability thus 
killing any new UN Security Council Resolutions or international sanctions against Iran.  
In Zarate’s analysis, there are practically no other counterproliferation tools left to 
persuade or alter a specific countries nuclear agenda, especially if a state is determined to 
have an illicit nuclear weapons program. It is clear that economic interdiction tools are 
not only the first choice, but are the only choice left in countering illicit nuclear behavior. 
Military force is unlikely to be used to change Iran’s nuclear behavior, and may only 
further entrench its nuclear agenda. Further complicating the use of military force is most 
international partners do not want to address proliferation in this manner for a variety of 
reasons. Using unilateral military force is additionally complicated, as the United States 
has been in perpetual war on two fronts in the Middle East in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Furthermore, multilateral and international diplomatic coercion has largely failed to 
persuade state actors from continuing a nuclear weapons program. Economic interdiction 
is practically the only instrument left on the table for Administrations to use in an attempt 
to persuade nuclear proliferating behavior, though past use of financial levers by 
themselves have not resulted in changed nuclear behavior. 
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Andrew C. Winner, a professor at the United States Naval War College, offers a 
counter argument to the effectiveness of the Bush Administration’s use of 
counterproliferation activities. According to Professor Winner, the Administration used 
counterproliferation more effectively and frequently than previous Administrations, and 
was now the “primary pillar” that engaged WMD. The interdiction of shipments was 
placed at the forefront of devices used to halt illicit transfers, ahead of the more 
traditional categories of deterrence, defense, and mitigation. Though the new pillar did 
not mention strengthening multilateral actions, the 2002 incident that involved the North 
Korean freighter So San was an example of such operations. The North Korean cargo 
ship was suspected of transporting WMD material to the Middle East and, as the ship 
approached Yemen, the United States asked Spain to interdict the vessel. Though the  
ship had issues with registration, which gave Spain the international authority to board, 
the discovered scud missile parts were allowed to continue to Yemen. The So San 
incident highlighted critical problems with invoking interdiction operations: the 
counterproliferation policy lacked structure, and participation was voluntary.35 
Overall, the Bush Administration wished to work outside the more formal legal 
international agreements and preferred informal multilateral partnerships. This type of 
strategy allowed the Administration to receive the strongest commitment possible from 
partner countries in a limited time frame. The So San incident further illustrated the need 
for an agreement with like-minded counterproliferation nations to streamline information 
and operations, which would be critical to all future interdiction activities. On May 31, 
2003, six months after the So San incident, President Bush announced the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), which was one of many counterproliferation measures 
implemented during Bush’s tenure. The PSI was an offshoot of the U.S. National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction that was issued in December 2002. 
The primary task of the PSI was designed to build capability among cooperating nations 
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to interdict the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their materials, and 
delivery systems.36  
Along with strengthening the PSI, the Obama administration supported further 
economic sanctions against the nuclear proliferating nation of Iran, which resulted in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929. UNSCR 1929 passed in 2010 and was 
the fourth round of sanctions against Iran. UNSCR 1929 targeted 41 individuals and 
entities to include; banking, defense, and shipping sectors. Additionally, UNSCR 1929 
stated nations should no longer allow Iran to procure enrichment components or 
technologies and prevent the transfer of conventional military arms to include; missiles 
and artillery. The UN notified that Iran if they stopped all enrichment activities, the UN 
would suspend all sanctions. Furthermore, the UN indicated that it would prefer to work 
diplomatically with Iran and work toward a permanent solution.37 
Along with United Nations Resolution 1929, Executive Order (EO)-Authorizing 
the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to Iran signed by 
President Obama, authorized the Treasury Department in conjunction with the 
Department of State to direct sanctions toward any significant foreign financial 
intuition’s transactions in relation to the Iranian Rial. Additionally, the EO bars all 
Iranian property and interests located in the United States. Furthermore, the EO targets 
individuals who provide support to the Iranian regime, to include Iranians located in the 
United States.38  
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Though the Bush Administration may have used counterproliferation more 
effectively or more often than previous presidents, the policy was arguably still largely 
ineffective at halting states that were committed to illicit nuclear expansion. The 
development of the PSI was a great idea, but the multilateral agreement was voluntary 
and lacked the teeth to fully stop the proliferation of nuclear goods. President Obama 
doubled down on the PSI, instituted further economic sanctions against Iran’s nuclear 
program, and pursued United Nation remedies; however, evidence gathered the current 
research indicates the increase in economic sanctions alone were ineffective at halting  
or slowing down Iran’s enrichment program. It is important to note that overall 
counterproliferation strategy spanning multiple presidencies and the use of various tools 
eventually brought Iran to the P5+1 negotiations, which has temporarily halted Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program.  
E. THE LESSONS OF ABDUL QADEER KHAN FOR 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY 
Abdul Qadeer Khan is celebrated and vilified as the “father of the Pakistani 
nuclear bomb.” A.Q. Khan was in charge of the Khan Research Laboratories and his 
illicit nuclear trading network was exposed in 2004. Over a two-decade time period, A.Q. 
Khan proliferated nuclear weapon designs, components, and materials by circumventing 
international nonproliferation rules. Khan used legitimate shipping and manufacturing 
hubs to provide his services. Additionally, Khan laundered his proceeds through foreign 
intermediaries, which helped to keep his illicit operation secret. The Khan case illustrated 
that nonproliferation strategy was ineffective because so-called secondary proliferators, 
which used loopholes in supply controls, were able to distribute illicit nuclear materials 
globally.39  
In their 2009 book, Dr. James Russell and Dr. James J. Wirtz from the United 
States Naval Postgraduate School argued, “the most dangerous and imminent threat of 
the 1990s came not from terrorists but from a WMD supply network based in a state and 
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which took advantage of offshore procurement and production possibilities afforded by 
global economic integration and interdependence.”40 Russell and Wirtz argued 
globalization further advanced the A.Q. Khan network by making it easier to transfer 
nuclear materials and technologies. Additionally, the Khan network used an elaborate 
network of individuals and companies to work around the international nonproliferation 
system in order to fulfill illicit purchases from non-state actors on behalf of state actors.41 
Besides his native Pakistan, Iran was A.Q. Khan’s first significant customer in 
1987. Iran eventually told the IAEA it had procured centrifuge technology from Pakistan; 
however, Iran for years ignored repeated requests from the IAEA for clarification. In 
2003, IAEA inspectors observed the centrifuges firsthand and recognized the Khan 
network designs. These revelations exposed the broad reach of the Khan network, which 
included nations, like Malaysia, which are not normally associated with nuclear 
technology but are exploited for ’its manufacturing infrastructure and loose export 
controls to produce nuclear components.42 The exposure of the AQ Kahn network 
prompted a new round of international efforts to upgrade the international control regime, 
which included expanded Nuclear Suppliers Group membership and control lists.43 
The A.Q. Khan network was extremely successful at working through loopholes 
in the systems, which included using skilled manufacturing capabilities that were able to 
evade export controls. The Khan network was able to utilize free trade zones and 
complex shipping arrangements to further its ability to transfer nuclear equipment. 
Furthering the complexity of the network, many companies were unaware the 
components they were manufacturing could be used for nuclear programs. The Nuclear 
Supplier Group (NSG) could have done a better job of updating export control lists in 
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order to close the loopholes exploited by A.Q. Khan.44  Overall, international export 
control of nuclear materials and technology was ineffective at stopping third party 
intermediary proliferation of nuclear goods. The NSG and WA have continually updated 
their export control lists; however, as the A.Q. Khan network proved, determined 
proliferators have and will find ways to work around these international regimes.  
F. THE NPT AND IRAN 
Iran often refers to the right for a peaceful nuclear program under the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). However, since at least 2004, Iran 
has obstructed inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of their 
centrifuges, even after the IAEA found traces of uranium at an undeclared nuclear site 
Nantanz.45 Additionally, the IAEA discovered evidence that Iran had an 18-year covert 
nuclear program. In 2004, the IAEA declared Iran in violation of safeguard requirements, 
which led to United Nations sanctions requiring Iran to produce data and halt their 
enrichment program.46  
According to the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s 
nuclear program, Iran stopped work on nuclear weapons in 2003, but continued covert 
enrichment and left the option to restart the development process of nuclear weapons 
open. It remained unclear if weapons activity associated with Iran’s nuclear program 
restarted and if the intention of eventually building nuclear weapon was still on the table. 
The NIE assessed Iran would more likely enrich its own uranium to produce fissile 
material covertly for a nuclear weapon if they decided to move forward. Though Iran had 
apparently stopped its weapons program, it continued to enrich uranium by installing new 
centrifuges at Nantanz. The NIE concluded with high confidence Iran would not be able 
to produce enough weapons grade material for a nuclear weapon before 2015.47  
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The IAEA has been unable to halt Iran’s increased production of Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU). In 2009, evidence surfaced that Iran was building a reactor at the 
Fordow cite, which could be used in the process of procuring plutonium for a nuclear 
weapon . The nuclear plant was based underground and located at a military complex. By 
February 2013, Iran had the ability to highly enrich uranium to nearly 20%. In response 
to IAEA inquiries to the increased production of HEU, Iran responded by announcing 
that it was developing a nuclear submarine, which could explain the need for possessing 
HEU. In addition to the increase in HEU production, Iran has significantly developed a 
commercial nuclear technical expertise. This increase of technical ability in both military 
and civilian industry has made it harder to detect and interdict materials that are used to 
produce a nuclear weapon.48 Overall, the IAEA has been largely ineffective at changing 
state-sponsored nuclear behavior, regardless if the country is a signatory of the NPT or 
not. Pakistan, India, and North Korea all now have nuclear weapons programs, and if and 
when Iran decides to pursue nuclear weapons, the IAEA alone will be unable to change 
such nuclear ambitions. 
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III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT  
AGAINST IRAN 
Over the last two centuries, the United States Department of the Treasury, with 
the assistance from the State and Justice Departments, has used the interdiction of global 
financial transactions and goods against nations and terrorist organizations as a means of 
accomplishing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.49 Since 1987, the 
United States has used financial sanctions to specifically target Iran’s ability to develop 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and support of international terrorism. The U.S. 
Treasury Department has attempted to interdict Iranian banking, oil, and import and 
export institutions’ finances in an effort to curb illicit activities. These sanctions or 
financial levers are normally administered by the Treasury Department, in coordination 
with other Cabinet-level Departments using presidential Executive Orders and statutes 
passed by Congress as authorization.50  
A. REAGAN THROUGH CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS 
President Ronald Reagan on October 29, 1987, issued Executive Order (E.O.) 
12613, which targeted Iranian imports using the Office of Foreign Assets Control. These 
sanctions were the first time the U.S. used financial interdiction against Iran because of 
its support and use of terrorism in the Middle East. Using Section 505 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 as the statutory authority, which was 
the prelude to the Iranian Transactions Regulations, Title 31, Part 560 of the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations, E.O. 12613 was issued to ensure imports from Iran would not 
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financially support Iranian aggression toward U.S. and U.S. allied flagged merchant 
shipping in the region.51  
President Bill Clinton issued E.O. 12957 on March 16, 1995, because of the 
continued Iranian support for international terrorism and pursuit of WMD. E.O. 12957 
marks the first time an Executive Order was issued against Iran because of its 
involvement in establishing a clandestine WMD program. E.O. 12957 prohibited U.S. 
involvement in Iranian oil development. On May 6th Clinton issued E.O. 12959, using 
the International Security and Development Cooperation Act, along with the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, which significantly increased economic sanctions 
against Iran. To clarify both E.O. 12957 and 12959, Clinton issued E.O. 13059 on August 
19, 1997, to prohibit most U.S. trade with Iran by any U.S. citizen, no matter where he or 
she was located.52 
The Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) signed by President 
Clinton in March of 2000 authorized sanctions on foreign persons or companies 
determined by the president to have assisted Iran in its nuclear weapons development. 
The sanctions included a ban on U.S. exportation of arms and dual-use items to Iran. 
Additionally, the law targeted the Russian Aviation and Space Agency. Payments to the 
Russian agency for the international space station would be withheld if the 
Administration suspected Russian support for Iranian WMD and missile development.53  
B. GEORGE W. BUSH THROUGH OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS 
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13382 on June 28, 2005, 
which attempted to stop Iranian proliferation activities and support networks. E.O. 13382 
was used to address additional concerns found after Clinton E.O. 12938 was signed in 
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1994, which declared a national emergency due to the proliferation of WMD and delivery 
technologies. E.O. 13382 attempted to halt Iranian access to U.S. financial and 
commercial intuitions by preventing U.S. citizens and companies from engaging in 
transactions with Iranian financial intuitions.54  
On November 10, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department issued further banking 
rules involving so-called “U-turn” transfers. U-turn transfers were banking transactions 
that involved Iranian financial transfers to non-Iranian foreign banks. These types of 
transfers allowed Iranian access to foreign markets that were blocked by the United 
States. Additionally, Treasury Department rules were put into place to prohibit any new 
investments by U.S. citizens, to include lines of credit, in Iran or property controlled by 
the Iranian government.55  
In June of 2010, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 
1929. This resolution was the fourth of a series of UNSC Resolutions (UNSCRs) that 
sanctioned Iran because of its nuclear weapons program and unwillingness to adhere to 
International Atomic Energy Agency verification under the Nonproliferation Treaty. 
UNSCR 1929 called upon all nations to intervene in financial transactions if they could 
be attributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. President Barack Obama signed the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) 
on July 1, 2010. According to the Department of the Treasury, “This law build(t) upon 
UNSCR 1929 by strengthening existing U.S. sanctions with respect to the Iranian energy 
industry, and adds the potential for the imposition of serious limits on foreign financial 
institutions’ access to the U.S. financial system if they engage in certain transactions 
involving Iran.”56 Additionally, this law targeted individuals and entities that engaged in 
illicit financial transactions with Iran. The list of persons or entities designated under this 
law was found under the Treasury Department’s SDN List (Specially Designated 
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Nationals).57 The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control published this 
list, which is a part of the overall enforcement-tracking tool used for targeting Iran’s 
financial institutions.58  
President Obama signed the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) on December 31, 2011. Additionally, on February 5, 2012, President Obama 
issued E.O. 13599. Both the NDAA and E.O. added additional sanctions against Iran. 
The NDAA and E.O. attempted to halt all property and interests with respect to the Bank 
of Iran and all other Iranian financial institutions. Furthermore, the federal statute and 
E.O. targeted individuals deemed by the Secretaries of the Treasury and State 
Departments to be acting directly or indirectly on the behalf of entities that were in 
support of Iranian illicit nuclear trade.59  
President Obama signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 on July 30, 2012, which 
authorized additional sanctions against Iran’s energy and oil industries. E.O. 13622 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, with the consultation of the Secretary of State, 
“to impose financial sanctions on foreign financial institutions found to have knowingly 
conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction with the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO).”60 Additionally, E.O. 13622 
authorized new sanctions against financial institutions that purchased oil products from 
Iran, or institutions that circumvented the NDAA that used illicit payments to procure 
Iranian oil products. Furthermore, E.O. 13622 authorized cabinet-level officials to 
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recommend sanctions against individuals and companies that knowingly engaged in the 
procurement of Iranian oil products.61  
Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA), 
which was a part of the Fiscal-Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. The law 
provided additional authorization for sanctions against Iran. The law targeted energy, 
shipping, shipbuilding, transfer of certain metals and other industrial mined materials, 
software, insurance, and financial transactions from a list of sanctioned individuals and 
companies. E.O. 13645 issued on June 3, 2013, implemented the IFCA sanctions. E.O. 
13645 additionally targeted the Iranian rial, automobile manufacturing, and individuals 
on the Special Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).62  
The Obama Administration and Congress have continued to craft executive orders 
and laws in order to target Iran’s ability to finance its nuclear weapons program and 
support for global terrorism. Part of the challenge that faced the U.S. Treasury 
Department was tracing the financial networks that fund illicit procurement of nuclear 
materials. Tracing these networks often required sophisticated analysis to pick out small 
pieces of information and put them together to fully understand the intricate network. To 
accomplish this task, the U.S. Treasury Department formed the Intelligence and Analysis 
task force in 2004. This task force was in charge of tracking, enforcing, and developing 
global economic sanctions.63 
Leslie Ireland, the head of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Intelligence and 
Analysis task force, argued sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department put 
significant pressure on Iran to come to the P5+1 negotiating table. Financial sanctions 
were effective at influencing Iran’s conduct. Bloomberg Business asked Ms. Ireland if 
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some within the national security community believed the United States was running out 
of sanction options against Iran. Ms. Ireland responded by pointing to the fact that the 
task force has been able to work with U.S. allies and international partners to further 
increase pressure on Iranian banks costing Iran over $40 billion in oil exports.64 
C. P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN 
The P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Germany) and Iran reached an agreement on November 24, 2013, which halted further 
Iranian nuclear development and slowed down uranium enrichment. The agreement was 
called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). In return, Iran received limited sanction relief for 
six months. The JPOA gave Iran a pathway to comply with its Nonproliferation Treaty 
obligations and follow the protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Safeguards Agreement.65 An extension of the JPOA has been extended twice. The 
November 24, 2014, extension was based on increased monitoring and verification of 
Iran’s fuel fabrication for the Tehran Research Reactor and decreased Iran’s UF6 
enrichment to 2%. The additional June 30, 2015, extension encompassed the continuation 
of increased monitoring and verification activities by the IAEA on Iran’s nuclear 
program.66 The JPOA ultimately led to the current P5+1 negotiations and subsequent 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement, which could be a permanent solution to 
Iran’s self-declared peaceful nuclear program.67  
On April 2, 2015, the P5+1 parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
regarding Iran’s nuclear programs had been reached. The agreed framework addressed 
Iranian enrichment, inspection protocols, sanctions, and reactor issues. Additionally, the 
agreed framework increased the breakout timeline for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. 
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According to the U.S. Treasury Department, immediate relief of current sanctions against 
Iran was not part of the agreed framework. Permanent sanctions relief would be 
implemented once the new agreement is signed and after Iran allowed IAEA-verified 
inspections of their nuclear facilities. Current sanctions relief reached on November 24, 
2013, under the Joint Plan of Action were still in effect. A final agreement will be 
negotiated by June 30, 2015.68 
After three additional months of negotiations between the P5+1 countries and 
Iran, a final agreement had been made on July 14, 2015. The deal cannot be finalized 
until the U.S. Congress has reviewed and approved the agreement.69 According to the 
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control’s Iran Watch, in order for the deal to be 
successful, the U.S. must achieve its four basic tenets set out at the being of the 
negotiations, called the “four ways” to a nuclear weapon. “Three of the four pathways 
involve Iran’s use of declared facilities to make fuel for a nuclear weapon in a “breakout” 
scenario: 1) Using the Nantanz plant to make highly enriched uranium, 2) Using the 
Fordow plant to make highly enriched uranium, 3) Extracting plutonium from spent fuel 
produced at the Arak heavy water reactor. The fourth pathway is Iran’s potential use of 
covert facilities to develop nuclear weapons in a “sneak out” scenario.”70 Under this 
agreement, economic and arms embargo sanctions, to include over 18 billion in frozen 
financial funds will be lifted; however, many of the details have not yet been released on 
the timeframe of the relief actions.  
Over the last four decades, five U.S. presidents have issued 13 Executive Orders 
and signed numerous laws in an attempt to interdict Iranian financial transactions and 
goods in order to diminish their ability to support an illicit nuclear weapons program and 
global terrorist activities. The United States has indicated it will continue to develop and 
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plan further financial sanctions against Iran if it continues to pursue a nuclear weapon. A 
final signed agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will ultimately determine if the United 
States and their departments are required to continue the interdiction of Iranian financial 
imports and exports. 
The enforcement of presidential Executive Orders and laws passed by Congress 
sanctioning Iran required coordination and enforcement from several Cabinet-level 
Departments within the U.S. government. These coordinated actions have negatively 
affected the Iranian economy and its future economic direction. According to the  
U.S. Government Accountability Office, “the Iranian economy has consistently 
underperformed the economies of comparable peer countries across a number of key 
economic indicators since 2010, when recent sanctions were enacted. In contrast to its 
peers, Iran’s oil production, oil export revenues, and economic growth estimates have 
fallen, and its inflation has increased.”71 The Justice Department and Treasury 
Departments has continued to target persons, banks, and other financial institutions that 
violated U.S. sanction laws and regulations. In addition to the prosecution and 
enforcement of sanctions, the Treasury and Justice Departments has assisted U.S. and 
international banks in addressing Iran’s illicit financial transactions.72 
D. ASSISTANCE TO AND FROM THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
One of the primary responsibilities of the U.S. Treasury Department is to assist 
U.S. and international financial institutions’ abilities to enforce and adhere to sanctions 
against Iran. “According to Treasury, since 2010, Treasury officials have conducted 
outreach to more than 145 foreign financial institutions in more than 60 countries as well 
as to foreign governments, regulators, and other trade groups and associations.”73 In an 
example of outreach by U.S. Treasury officials, several trips were made to the United 
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Arab Emirates to discuss newly enacted sanctions against Iran with UAE financial 
institutions and how better to enforce these regulations.74  
Financial institutions are crucial to the process of stopping transactions that are 
blocked by U.S. law or presidential Executive Order. Financial institutions are required to 
notify the U.S. Treasury Department of improper financial transactions. Additionally, 
sanction requirements require financial institutions to cut off transactions that “are by, or 
on behalf of, a blocked individual or entity; (2) are to, or go through, a blocked entity; or 
(3) are in connection with a transaction in which a blocked individual or entity has an 
interest.”75  
Financial institutions may also self-report potential violations of the law to the 
U.S. Treasury Department. Normally, banks are allowed to further investigate the 
violations and forward their findings to the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). 
After a thorough review of the banking records, the OFAC determines what, if any, 
violations of the law have occurred. Violations of Iranian sanction laws or presidential 
Executive Orders may result in a civil judgment of $250,000 per violation, or twice the 
amount of the value of the transaction, whichever is greater.76 
E. THE PROSECUTION OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY: U.S. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT  
The GAO reported that, “According to Treasury, as of January 2013, OFAC had 
designated more than 360 individuals and entities–including banks, energy companies, 
and businesses–linked to Iran’s weapons-of-mass-destruction program and support for 
terrorism under various Iran-related executive orders. These designations included 
actions taken under Treasury’s executive order authorities related to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and 
international terrorism.”77 In 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions 
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under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) 
upon two foreign banks designated by OFAC.78  
In one of the two cases, the U.S. Treasury Department found China’s Bank of 
Kunlun was complicit in working with multiple Iranian financial institutions designated 
by the United States as supporting Iranian WMD programs and terrorist efforts. The 
Treasury Department specifically found the Chinese bank provided millions of dollars’ 
worth of financial services to Iranian banks designated by the Treasury Department. In 
response, the U.S. Treasury Department prohibited all U.S. financial intuitions from 
using the Chinese bank, thus blocking all Bank of Kunlun access to the U.S. banking 
system.
79
 In the second case, the U.S. Treasury Department found the Elaf Islamic Bank 
in Iraq knowingly facilitated financial transactions and services for designated Iranian 
banks. Like the Bank of Kunlun, the Treasury Department blocked Elaf Bank’s access to 
the U.S. banking system.80  
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. Treasury Department has issued punitive actions 
against financial institutions that are found in violation of Iranian sanction regulations. 
According to OFAC, the office has imposed 45 civil judgments since 2005 against banks 
for violating sanction regulations by facilitating financial transactions on behalf of 
Iranian interests. In one example, the U.S. Treasury announced a $619 million settlement 
with ING Direct Bank N.V. because of their involvement in $1.6 billion worth of illicit 
Iranian financial transactions.81 
Other federal and state regulators further imposed enforcement actions against 
financial institutions in coordination with the OFAC. According to the GAO, “For 
example, in 2005 the Federal Reserve, FinCEN, the New York State Banking 
Department, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, and OFAC 
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announced the assessment of penalties against the Dutch bank ABN AMRO based, in 
part, on OFAC violations. The agencies jointly assessed $75 million in penalties against 
the bank on the basis of findings that it participated in transactions that violated U.S. 
sanctions laws, as well as findings of the bank’s failures related to U.S. anti-money 
laundering laws and regulations and other banking laws.”82 
F. THE PROSECUTION OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY: U.S. 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
The United States Justice Department, through the Criminal Division, National 
Security Division, and U.S. Attorney’s Office has investigated seven banks since 2009 
for violations against U.S. sanctions law with respect to Iran. The violations of law 
originated from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).83 The 
IEEPA was signed in 1977 and grants the president authorization against “any unusual 
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if 
the president declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”84 When 
financial institutions violate the IEEPA and the regulations associated with the law, the 
institution may be found criminally liable for its actions. 
In all seven cases, the financial institutions’ violations of the law were resolved 
through pretrial settlements, which led to monetary damages and deferred prosecutions. 
These financial institutions included; HSBC Bank USA N.A., Standard Chartered Bank, 
ING Bank N.V., Barclays Bank PLC, ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Credit Suisse AG, and 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC. In 2012, HSBC Bank USA N.A. settled with the Justice 
Department for a record amount of $1.236 billion.85  
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Department of Justice (DOJ) officials argued the seven bank’s actions constituted 
“threats to both national security and the integrity of the U.S. financial system posed by 
the banks’ misconduct. Furthermore, in each investigation, the bank systematically 
removed or obscured payment data that would have revealed the involvement of 
sanctioned countries and entities, including Iran.”86 According to federal law 
enforcement officials, the Credit Suisse AG Bank violated the IEEPA for 11 years by 
purposely deleting information from banks accounts, such as names, bank names, 
addresses, and other vital information, in order to circumvent Iran sanctions. The 
information consisted of deleted payments messages so that financial transactions would 
not be flagged by U.S. banks as illicit. Additionally, Credit Suisse circumvented OFAC 
regulations by providing Iranian clients paperwork that indicated how to avoid detection 
by U.S. officials. Over an 11-year period Credit Suisse was able to assist in the transfer of 
millions of dollars throughout the U.S. banking system until the DOJ was able to halt the 
illegal activity.87  
In 2012, HSBC Holdings, PLC and HSBC Bank USA N.A. agreed to defer 
prosecutions from the DOJ due to their violations of IEEPA and the Trading With the 
Enemy Act. The violations occurred in connection with Iran and other sanctioned 
countries. According to DOJ documents, HSBC Holdings, PLC authorized $660 million 
in banned transactions through U.S. financial institutions, including their subsidiary in the 
United States (HSBC Bank USA N.A.) over a two-decade period. An official from the 
Federal Reserve indicated that HSBC Holdings, PLC permitted its subsidiaries to allow 
sanctioned countries, including Iran, to delete their names from U.S. monetary financial 
transaction messages sent to banks located in the United States. In all seven cases, federal 
prosecutors deferred prosecutions using prosecutorial discretion because the financial 
institutions worked diligently at fixing the issues, admitted fault, and cooperated during 
the investigation.88 
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In recent developments, the DOJ has charged four companies and five persons for 
their assistance in providing $24 million worth of sanctioned goods to the Iranian military 
and nuclear development industries. The Wisconsin Project reported that “according to a 
24-count federal indictment unsealed on April 17, the procurement network conspired to 
export sensitive American-made electronic components with military applications to Iran 
via companies in Taiwan and Turkey, in violation of U.S. law. The network allegedly 
began operating in July 2010 and was still active at the time of the indictment.”89  
The illicit network provided the Iranian government with microelectronic 
components made in the United States. One of these U.S.-made components was the 
uninterrupted power supplies (UPS). The UPS was a critical electronic component for 
ballistic missile systems and nuclear applications. The illicit trade network illustrated 
Iran’s ability to adapt and evade sanctions. Some of the methods used included:  
transshipment through third countries to mask the final destination; 
undervaluing goods; falsifying product codes to remove military 
designations; mingling export-controlled items with non-controlled items 
to avoid scrutiny; falsifying shipment statements to remove reference to 
Iranian ports; modifying and tailoring payments to ensure that amounts 
and bank names would not raise flags; and the use of personal e-mail 
accounts to discuss how to evade U.S. law.90  
G. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS 
In addition to the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments, the State Department 
assisted in curtailing Iranian illicit economic trade. Most of these actions involved 
reaching out to countries that knowingly or unknowingly continued to conduct sanctioned 
trade with Iran. Most of this regulated trade included assistance in procuring materials for 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. 
According to leaked State Department cables, analyzed by the Institute for 
Science and International Security, Secretaries Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice 
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directed the U.S. embassy in Beijing to approach the Chinese government about the 
transfer of nuclear technology and materials. In 2010, information was made available to 
the Chinese government that an Iranian company had attempted to purchase five tons of 
carbon fiber, which is often used in the manufacturing of ballistic missiles and 
centrifuges, from a Chinese company. The Iranian company was the Shahid Bakeri 
Industries Group, which is associated with Iran’s ballistic missile program and is 
sanctioned under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.91 
Additionally, in 2007, the U.S. State Department asked the Chinese government 
to stop the immediate transfer of cargo destined to Iran through North Korea. The U.S. 
government had evidence that the cargo contained jet vanes for missiles and other 
materials for Iran’s ballistic missile program. Chinese officials responded by stating these 
types of shipments do not exist, and declined to cooperate in the stopping of this transfer 
and others that were similar in nature. U.S. State Department records indicated a total of 
10 illicit transfers to Iran from Chinese companies have occurred, which have consisted 
of ballistic missile materials and parts.92 
In three other similar cases, the U.S. State Department has approached the 
countries of Germany, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom concerning illicit ballistic 
missile trade to Iran. In the Germany case, the State Department approached the German 
government about Iran’s attempt to procure items from German companies that 
manufacture environmental condition simulators for missiles. In the Ukraine case, the 
State Department notified the Ukrainian government that Iran was procuring steel and 
other materials used in the manufacturing of missile propellants. Lastly, in the United 
Kingdom case, the State Department notified their British counterparts that intelligence 
had surfaced that indicated an Indian company headquartered inside the United Kingdom 
was involved in providing materials to Iran for its Bushehr reactor. These materials 
included cladding, thermal insulation, and other required equipment. There was no 
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further information in the leaked documents concerning whether the three foreign 
governments cooperated with the U.S. State Department in halting the nuclear materials 
destined for Iran.93  
H. IRANIAN ADAPTATION 
According to the GAO, U.S. and international trade, investment, and financial 
sanctions have damaged Iran’s economy and future prospects. Analysis by the GAO has 
found Iran’s economy has underperformed against its peers since the sanctions of 2010 
and 2012 have been implemented. Additionally, the GAO observed the sanctions have 
impacted Iran’s oil production, oil export revenue, and gross domestic product (GDP), 
which all have declined significantly. To combat the deteriorating situation in Iran, the 
GAO indicates through unclassified reports that “the government of Iran is attempting to 
adapt to the sanctions through various means, including using alternative payment 
mechanisms such as barter agreements, but thus far these agreements have not fully offset 
Iran’s reduced oil exports.”94 
According to the unclassified documents, Iran has attempted to circumvent U.S. 
and international sanctions levied against them. One of the alternate financial avenues 
Iran has used in an attempt to subvert sanctions is selling oil at discounts to customers 
willing to pay in their own currency. In another attempt to circumvent sanctions, Iran 
used so-called barter agreements. One of these barter agreements is with India. Iran has 
exchanged oil products for food, medicine, and other commercial products. Using barter 
methods for the selling of oil required Iran to sell below market value. The GAO 
additionally observed Iran has continued to pursue oil deals with regional partners to 
include Pakistan and India. However, these potential deals will not offset the decline in 
oil products destined for the European Union due to the new restrictions imposed by U.S. 
and international sanctions.95 
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 Although Iran’s daily business transactions have been negatively affected by the 
economic sanctions, Iran has continued to use loopholes found in international sanctions. 
Iran has used of a network of companies that on their face seem legitimate; however, 
these companies provided a cover for Iranian shipping using false flags of registration. 
These deceptive tactics are primarily found in tax haven countries such as Malta, Cyprus, 
the Bahamas, and Hong Kong, which allowed Iran to purchase flags and registries in 
order to evade international economic sanctions. Additionally, many countries did not 
report their business activities with Iran, which have often included discounted oil 
products. Overall, Iran has been successful at adapting and using deceptive tactics in 
order to avoid the full impact of economic sanctions.96  
As Iran continually attempted to circumvent U.S. and international economic 
sanctions with elaborate schemes, the U.S. Treasury, Justice, and State Departments 
needed to continually coordinate their efforts against Iran and Iran’s nuclear accomplices. 
Though economic sanctions have drastically impacted the Iranian economy, Iran has 
continued to pursue and develop nuclear materials and technologies. U.S. and 
international governments must adapt and become more creative in the development of 
economic sanctions targeting Iran’s economy and clandestine behavior, because Iran has 
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IV. EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INTERDICTION 
According to a June 17, 2015, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control report, 
Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel a nuclear warhead using 
9,000 first-generation centrifuges operating at the Nantanz Fuel Enrichment Plant in two 
months. Additionally, Iran could speed up the production of a nuclear weapon using 
1,000 more advanced IR-2m centrifuges installed at Nantanz. The Wisconsin Project 
further reported, “Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium is now sufficient, after further 
enrichment, to fuel approximately eight nuclear warheads.”97 As Iran continues to assert 
that its nuclear program is peaceful, it has been noted Iran has no current need to enrich 
uranium to generate nuclear energy because of a 10-year Russian agreement to provide 
enriched uranium to Iran for its reactor at Bushehr.98 
A. IRANIAN BREAKOUT TIMELINES AND CENTRIFUGE OPERATIONS 
The Wisconsin Project offered Iranian so-called breakout timelines to a nuclear 
weapon, if they continue to use current centrifuge technology at Nantanz (Figure 1). 
Though the Wisconsin Project offered these scenarios on Iranian breakout times, and the 
International for Science and International Security offer similar timelines, there is little 
unclassified historical data on Iranian nuclear weapon breakout. Due to the lack of data, 
the analysis conducted for this thesis will specifically examine the Nantanz Enrichment 
Facility and the number of centrifuges being operated. Nantanz centrifuge operation will 
be used to argue whether a correlation exists between economic sanctions and uranium 
enrichment production as a means to further develop material for a nuclear weapon.  
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Figure 1.  Iranian Breakout Timelines to a Nuclear Weapon. 
If Iran feeds its IR-centrifuges with natural uranium and operates: 
• 9,000 centrifuges (the number now running): 
6.8 months 
• 6,104 centrifuges (the number allowed to be installed under the  
framework agreement): 
10.1 months 
• 5,060 centrifuges (the number allowed to operate under the  
framework agreement): 
1 year 
If Iran feeds its IR-centrifuges with low-enriched uranium and operates:  
• 9,000 centrifuges:  1.6 months 
 
• 6,104 centrifuges: 2.4 months 
 
• 5,060 centrifuges: 2.9 months 
 
Adapted from Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable,” Wisconsin 
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 17, 2015, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-
publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable. 
It is assumed an increase in centrifuge operation results in Iran being able to 
manufacture weapons-grade uranium at an increased rate, thus causing the breakout 
timeline to decrease. For reference (Figure 2), is the Wisconsin Project chart of centrifuge 
operations at the Nantanz Fuel Enrichment Plant based on International Atomic Energy 




Figure 2.  Centrifuge operations at the Nantanz Fuel Enrichment Plant based 
on International Atomic Energy Agency Quarterly Reports. 
Date of IAEA 
Inventory 
IR-1 Centrifuges Being Fed with 
UF6 
Other IR-1 Centrifuges 
Installed 
17 Feb 2007 0 656 
13 May 2007 1,312 820 
19 Aug 2007 1,968 656 
3 Nov 2007 2,952 0 
12 Dec 2007 2,952 ? 
7 May 2008 3,280 2,624 
30 Aug 2008 3,772 2,132 
7 Nov 2008 3,772 2,132 
1 Feb 2009 3,936 1,968 
1 Jun 2009 4,920 2,296 
12 Aug 2009 4,592 3,716 
2 Nov 2009 3,936 4,920 
31 Jan 2010 3,772 4,838 
24 May 2010 3,936 4,592 
28 Aug 2010 3,772 5,084 
5 Nov 2010 4,816 3,610 
16 Nov 2010 0 ~ 8,426 
22 Nov 2010 ~4,592 ~3,834 
20 Feb 2011 ~5,184 ~2,816 
14 May 2011 ~5,860 ~2,140 
28 Aug 2011 ~5,860 ~2,140 
2 Nov 2011 ~6,208 ~1,792 
19 Feb 2012 8,808 348 
19 May 2012 8,818 512 
21 Aug 2012 9,156 270 
10 Nov 2012 9,156 1,258 
19 Feb 2013 ~8,990 ~3,680 
15 May 2013 ~8,990 ~4,565 
24 Aug 2013 9,156 6,260 
9 Nov 2013 ~8,800 ~6,620 
10 Feb 2014 ~9,000 ~6,420 
14 May 2014 ~9,000 ~6,420 
13 Aug 2014 ~9,000 ~6,420 
15 Oct 2014 ~9,000 ~6,420 
8 Feb 2015 9,156 6,264 
17 May 2015 9,156 6,264 
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Date of IAEA 
Inventory 
IR-2m Centrifuges Being Fed 
with UF6 
IR-2m Centrifuges Installed 
19 Feb 2013 0 180 
15 May 2013 0 689 
24 Aug 2013 0 1,008 
9 Nov 2013 0 1,008 
10 Feb 2014 0 1,008 
14 May 2014 0 1,008 
13 Aug 2014 0 1,008 
15 Oct 2014 0 1,008 
8 Feb 2015 0 1,008 
17 May 2015 0 1,008 
Source: Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable,” Wisconsin 
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 17, 2015, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-
publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable. 
B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS VERSUS URANIUM DEVELOPMENT 
Evidence indicated a correlation did not exist between an increase in economic 
sanctions and a decrease in uranium enrichment development. Economic interdiction 
appeared ineffective at slowing down Iran’s uranium enrichment development thus 
decreased the time required to build a nuclear weapon. For example, on June 28, 2005, 
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13382 due to Iran’s nuclear 
proliferation activities. Iran responded two years later by installing 656 IR-1 centrifuges 
at Nantanz. Additionally, on November 10, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department issued 
further banking rules against Iran; however, Iran continued manufacturing centrifuges 
and saw increased growth to 2,132. Furthermore, Iranian centrifuges being fed UF6 
increased substantially to 3772.99 Centrifuges being fed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 
further assisted in the enrichment of uranium and the separation of U-235 from U-238. 
Infusing centrifuges with UF6 was well established as one of the precursors for possible 
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nuclear weapons development as the process is highly technical and decreases the time to 
manufacture nuclear weapons grade fissile material.100 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 1929 in 
June of 2010, which called on all nations to intervene in financial transactions attributable 
to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), 
which further implemented economic controls on financial institutions working with Iran. 
However, Iran’s IR-1 centrifuge growth rose to 3,610 in November and additional growth 
was observed in centrifuges being fed UF6 to 4,816.101  
President Barack Obama further sanctioned Iranian banking industries and 
individuals who were complicit in support if Iranian nuclear facilities in the 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act and Executive Order (EO) 13599. President Obama 
further issued two additional EOs against Iranian banking interests; however, according 
to the IAEA, Iran increased its operation of 54 cascades of approximately 9,000 first-
generation IR-1 centrifuges using UF-6 infusing.102 
Overall, evidence indicated Iran continued to develop and increase its uranium 
enrichment program regardless of strong and growing U.S. and international economic 
sanctions, thus Iran’s breakout timeline to a nuclear weapon continued to decrease. 
Without the recent nuclear agreement between the P5+1 countries and Iran, centrifuge 
growth and further enrichment would be expected to increase and a nuclear weapon 
would be imminent. 
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C. EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN’S ECONOMY 
One of the major impacts of financial interdiction has been the toll on Iran’s 
economy, particularly inflation. Extreme inflation has been caused primarily by the 
disruption of supply chains and increasing operating costs due the economic sanctions 
placed by the United States and its partners. According to a June 2015 report by the 
Iranian Central Bank, inflation was expected to rise by 22.2 percent; however, many 
economists believe this report is inaccurate and inflation is significantly higher. Recent 
evidence of extreme increases in food prices is suggestive of higher-than-reported 
inflation. Further impacting the Iranian economy as a result of economic sanctions is the 
fall of Iran’s currency. The Iranian rial has continually fallen in value against foreign 
currencies and Iranians are scrambling to acquire U.S. dollars on the black market, which 
is a sign that Iranians are alarmed at the current state of the economy.103 
According to Kenneth Katzman from the Congressional Research Service, “broad 
international sanctions on Iran’s key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran’s economy 
and contributed to Iran’s acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its 
nuclear program for sanctions relief.”104 Economic sanctions were able to constrict Iran’s 
oil exports from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to 1.1 million in the middle of 2013. 
Additionally, Iran’s economy sunk by 10% until limited sanctions relief was instituted in 
2014. In 2014, Iran agreed to the interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action), which 
was previously discussed.105 
Many argue Iran’s acceptance of the JPOA, and more recent JCPOA, is evidence 
that economic sanctions have altered Iran’s nuclear agenda. However, Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program has continually advanced in the face of economic sanctions, to include 
advanced ballistic missile technology. Furthermore, according to Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Vann Van 
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Diepen, “Iran was still very actively creating front companies and engaging in other 
activity to conceal procurement.”106  
Other observers have argued economic sanctions have slowed down the 
procurement and development of Iran’s nuclear program; however, little evidence of that 
assessment is found and is primarily assumed. Economic sanctions and near economic 
collapse appear to be one of the primary factors in Iran’s wish to be reintegrated into the 
international community, which ultimately was proved in the 2013 Iranian election of the 
most moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani. One of Rouhani’s political platforms was the 
seeking of economic sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear concessions.107 Overall, 
U.S. and international sanctions have negatively impacted Iran’s economy and changed 
its political landscape, which ultimately led to the P5+1 negotiations and subsequent 
agreement to suspend Iranian nuclear weapons related programs.  
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V. CURRENT P5+1 AGREEMENT, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
On July 14, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 countries reached a final nuclear agreement. 
The United States and its partner negotiators were able to secure restrictions on the 
amount of uranium Iran can store in its stockpile for the next 15 years. The agreement 
required Iran to reduce its low enriched uranium stockpile by 98 percent. The destination 
of the low enriched uranium is undetermined, though there is discussion of Russia taking 
some of the Iranian stockpile. Additionally, the agreement restricted two-thirds of Iran’s 
centrifuge operations at Nantanz.108 The restriction limits Iran to 5060 operational 
centrifuges and the remaining offline centrifuges can be used for replacement parts.109 
The restriction in centrifuge enrichment operations extended the amount of time to build 
a nuclear weapon to one year. Furthermore, the agreement required all questions to be 
answered concerning Iran’s past nuclear operations within three months. However, the 
agreement is unclear whether IAEA inspectors will be able to interview the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard scientists and engineers whom are alleged to have been at the center 
of designing a nuclear weapon.110 
The agreement also addressed the reimplementation of sanctions. Negotiators 
designed a procedure to “snap back” the sanctions if it was determined that Iran violated 
the terms of the nuclear agreement. In order to immediately reinstitute economic 
sanctions, an eight-member panel (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, 
Germany, the European Union, and Iran) would vote by a simple majority to determine if 
sufficient evidence indicated that Iran is in breach of the agreement and if an 
investigation is required. If the majority votes in favor of an investigation, the IAEA has 
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65 days to investigate suspicious activity. In the event illicit activity is found, sanctions 
relief under the agreement will be immediately reversed.111 
According to Simon Chin and Valerie Lincy of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear 
Arms Control, “The nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 reached in Vienna on July 
14, 2015 establishes a step-by-step sequence for Iran to receive relief from the sanctions 
that have crippled its economy.”112  Chin and Lincy reported, economic sanctions that 
have been the most catastrophic to the Iranian economy will be lifted in months. Though 
nuclear, missile, and arms restrictions are scheduled to be lifted in five years. However, 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and a draft U.N. resolution suggested the arms 
control sanctions relief could come sooner.113  
Most of the sanctions placed on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, which are 
highly important to development of a nuclear weapon, are expected to extend throughout 
most of the duration of any long-term agreement. The concern is, “unless Iran verifiably 
stops its illegal nuclear and nuclear-related procurements, it will severely weaken the 
verifiability and value of a long-term nuclear agreement. Iran could use these black 
market procurement methods to gather secretly the wherewithal to build covert nuclear 
plants and to enable a surge in installation of nuclear facilities in case it reneges on the 
agreement.”114 An additional concern is Iran’s past statements seem to have indicated 
that they intend to continue its illicit acquisition networks and to continue procuring 
materials that are illegal.115  
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A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Evidence in the thesis indicated that current U.S.-led financial interdiction is 
ineffective at curtailing Iran’s nuclear enrichment program; however, financial 
interdiction, coupled with other counterproliferation tools, has ultimately changed Iranian 
nuclear behavior. In response to these findings, financial interdiction measures must be 
continually developed and updated to facilitate a more effective counterproliferation 
weapon. If Iran violates the JCPOA, economic levers must be widened in scope, to 
include the use against United States allies. Supporting Iran’s nuclear weapons program 
regardless if the support is state sponsored or simply giving companies a safe haven to 
operate must now be seriously addressed. The United States must give these complicit 
countries an ultimatum, either continue to have economic ties with a state that is in the 
process of developing a nuclear weapon or expect the U.S. to sever all economic 
assistance, to include military cooperation. This option does have some drawbacks. The 
United States provides many countries with financial assistance, some of which could not 
survive without these funds. This recommendation could cause a financial vacuum and a 
potential adversary could fill this void, thus further exacerbating nuclear support. 
Additionally, some of these countries provide assistance to the U.S. in their geographic 
area, which supports a wide range of policy goals. This option should be considered if 
further diplomatic pressure and potential withdraw of financial assistance does not 
change the targeted country’s behavior in its dealings with Iran. 
Additional economic interdiction should also include complete oil and trade 
embargos. Current economic interdiction has not included such extreme measures; 
however, such measures would add significant political and economic pressure on Iran. 
This type of interdiction does require broad international support and a coalition willing 
to assist in such an embargo. In today’s current international climate this could prove 
difficult. A multilateral agreement is the more likely successful approach to this type of 
increased economic interdiction, though the implementation of an embargo will require 
significant counterproliferation assets. An additional drawback to this type of overt 
military action is it may cause Iran to react militarily, because this operation is an 
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extreme economic measure, which would drastically choke off Iran’s economy and more 
than likely bring complete economic collapse thus causing Iran to act impulsively.  
In addition to increasing economic pressure, the United States should develop a 
more robust offensive economic cyber capability. The U.S. must act more proactively in 
interfering with Iran’s nuclear development in the cyber domain. The U.S. can further 
impact Iran’s economy by interfering with their infrastructure. The targeting of Iran’s 
banking, utility, and manufacturing industries would have significant negative 
repercussions for their economy. This recommendation could be extremely effective at 
targeting Iran’s behavior and illicit conduct, though there are two potential drawbacks. 
The increase in offensive cyber attacks could result in an increase of cyber attacks on the 
U.S. homeland from Iran and their partners. Also, these types of actions could be 
perceived as an act of war, thus resulting in an armed conflict. Overall, this policy 
recommendation would be very useful in obtaining a more favorable change in behavior 
from Tehran. 
If diplomatic negotiations and revised economic sanctions do not work to curtail 
Iran’s nuclear weapon development and the United States is truly committed to halting 
such activity, then military kinetic action is the only viable option left. Military action has 
many potential risks. One of the major risks in military action against Iran is that it would 
start a war in the region. War in the Middle East would be catastrophe to the region’s 
economy, and possibly have a ripple effect throughout the global markets. Shipping in 
and out of the region would be severely impacted by the conflict and ultimately cause the 
global economy to contract due to an increase in oil prices and other goods. Other 
drawbacks to conflict in the region include, but are not limited to: Further restrained 
relations with Russia, Syria, and Hezbollah, and the potential of drawing them into the 
conflict. If this occurs, the conflict could bleed over into other areas of the Middle East 
setting off a world war. Additionally, military action would further entrench Iran’s 
nuclear weapons agenda. If this option is used then all other options, to include all 
counter and nonproliferation tools, have been exhausted and the United States has no 
choice but to address Iran militarily. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
The United States government’s ability to craft and enforce sanctions is limited, 
and up to this point sanctions have been largely ineffective at stopping further enrichment 
activities. The United States has only targeted financial institutions that conduct business 
in or with the U.S. The U.S. government should continue to work diligently within the 
interagency framework and with international partners to address the design, 
implementation, and enforcement of sanctions against Iran until lifted under the P5+1 
nuclear agreement. U.S.-led economic counterproliferation policy failed at slowing down 
Iran’s enrichment programs, because economic sanctions were not used to the fullest 
extent possible. However, economic interdiction, along with other counterproliferation 
tools, ultimately brought Iran to the negotiating table with the P5+1 countries and 
subsequent agreement by crippling their economy over time. 
Regardless of Iran’s future actions and adherence to the agreement, the U.S. must 
continue researching and developing economic sanctions that will generate more 
effective interdiction operations. One of the major obstacles to any international proposal 
of economic interdiction is the Iranian relationship with Russia and China. Russia’s and 
China’s veto abilities at the United Nation’s Security Council and overt assistance to the 
Iranian regime severely degrades the range of options left for the United States and its 
allies. Continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with U.S. partners, as prior 
residential administrations have, will most likely be the only avenue to produce the best 
results in addressing Iran’s behavior.  
 As evidence indicated, current economic interdiction by itself failed to slow down 
or halt Iranian centrifuge operations and resulted in a decreased time to build a nuclear 
weapon. Unless the U.S. can further develop and implement more effective economic and 
counterproliferation measures, the U.S. and its allies must make preparations for a 
nuclear-armed Iran. A potential shift in influence and balance of power will cause a 
ripple effect throughout the Middle East and quite possibly start an arms race in the 
region. The United States must adapt quickly and effectively to reassure their regional 
partners that a nuclear-armed Iran does not change the balance of power in the region. If 
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the United States can formulate a concise foreign policy then an Iranian nuclear weapon 
introduced into the region would lose some of its potential influence. 
C. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OF ECONOMIC INTERDICTION 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Further research of financial interdiction as a counterproliferation tool against 
other aspects of Iranian proliferation is warranted. One of those aspects is Iran’s ballistic 
missile program. Research and analysis should be conducted to examine if economic 
interdiction influenced Iran’s efforts at developing a ballistic missile. Additionally, 
classified research and analysis should be conducted to address Iranian covert 
procurement of illicit nuclear materials and technologies, and if financial interdiction was 
effective at stopping covert illicit trade. 
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